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INITIATIVE PETITION REFORMS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
EMILY CALHOUN*
Contrary to popular understanding, the initiative petition
process does not embody a type of petitioning that is constitu-
tionally guaranteed.' Colorado's initiative petition and the
First Amendment petition for redress of grievances could not be
more different. In these comments, I will explain my under-
standing of those differences in order to shed light on how we
ought to think about proposed changes to Colorado's initiative
process.' In particular, I hope to show why we should not
adopt "reforms" like those embodied in Colorado's proposed, but
defeated, Amendment 12.? Such reforms would incapacitate
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Cf, e.g., American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, No. 93-1467
(D. Colo. filed July 14, 1993), denial of interlocutory appeal affd, 33 F.3d 62 (10th
Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction because it is not clear that
state initiative process has First Amendment stature).
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
My evaluation of proposals to reform Colorado's initiative petition process is
based on research into the First Amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. My comments here are based on a longstanding interest in
the relationship of the First Amendment to voting rights. See, e.g., Emily
Calhoun, Voice in Government: The People, 8 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLY 427 (1994) [hereinafter Calhoun, Voice in Government]; Emily Calhoun, The
First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV.
549 (1985) [hereinafter Calhoun, The First Amendment]. The former article should
be consulted for a more extensive explanation of the ideas offered in these
comments.
3. Amendment 12, insofar as it relates to initiative petitions and other forms
of direct democracy, was described on the ballot as:
An amendment to ... restrict public resources used in ballot issue
campaigns; to require a mandatory fine for willful violations of the
campaign contribution, public expenditure, and petition provisions; to
extend petition powers to residents of all political jurisdictions; to allow
judges to be recalled and bar recalled judges from any future judicial
position; to limit petition ballot titles to 75 words and to revise other
procedural and substantive petition provisions for the initiative,
referendum, and recall; to limit the annual number of bills that govern-
ments may exclude from referendum by petition; to limit the reasons for
invalidating petition signatures; to repeal changes in state petition laws
or regulations adopted after 1988 unless voter-approved; to prevent
elected officials from changing certain voter-approved laws; and to
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the government from fulfilling its responsibility to act as a
trustee for all of the people of the state.
Other articles in this issue discuss how the initiative
petition process works, so I will turn immediately to the First
Amendment petition for redress of grievances. The principle
that there is a fundamental right to petition government for
redress of grievances has a long history.4 It was recognized in
the Magna Carta in 1215, and in subsequent centuries its
importance was repeatedly reaffirmed. The principle was
transported to America, in part via charters for colonial
government, where it became firmly embedded in the American
political and legal system. Petitioning was a primary source of
bills in pre-constitutional America.' For example, fifty-two
percent of the acts passed in Pennsylvania between 1717 and
1775 originated in petitions to the government.6 In the
colonies, petitioning was used to insist that public matters that
might otherwise be ignored were included on legislative
agendas, to bring problems to the attention of government, and
simply to provide information to government.7 Petitioning even
seems to have been accorded a status superior to that of free
speech and press; the latter rights received derivative protection
largely because they would ensure that petitioning would be
meaningful and effective.8
authorize individual, class action, or district suits to enforce the
amendment.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF 1994
BALLOT PROPOSALS, Res. Pub. No. 392, 20 (1994). See Richard B. Collins & Dale
Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 75 n.142, 77 n.145, 99 n.245 (1995), for a more detailed
description of the Amendment's provisions.
4. My brief historical discussion is generally based on the accounts of
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams,
Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113
(1991); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging...": An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986);
Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government
for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986). Where appropriate, below,
I have indicated specific page references to these authorities.
5. Higginson, supra note 4, at 144.
6. MORGAN, supra note 4, at 229.
7. Higginson, supra note 4, at 144-55.
8. See, e.g., Frederick, supra note 4, at 115-16 (asserting the general point);
Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 SUP.
CT. REV. 303, 333 n.135 (noting that some constitutional commentaries used
stronger wording for petition rights than for speech rights generally); Smith, supra
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Despite the fact that petitioning rights (and the corollary
right of the people to assemble) were historically extremely
important, there was debate about whether a petition right
should be included in the Constitution and, if so, what form
that petition right should take.9 Some believed that a form of
petitioning should be adopted that would enable voters to
"instruct" (or bind) their representatives to vote in a particular
way on a given issue.' ° James Madison, however, strongly
disagreed. He advocated a version of the First Amendment
right to petition government that he believed would not
undermine the purposes of the representative form of govern-
ment generally embodied in the Constitution." Madison's
version of the right of petition preserved the citizen's right of
direct access to government but gave to elected representatives
the ultimate power and responsibility for debating, adopting, or
rejecting a particular petition.
Madison rejected a petition right of instruction in favor of
the First Amendment right we now enjoy because he adhered
to a familiar theory of government and understanding of human
nature. Madison believed that representative government (for
all practical purposes an inevitable feature of decisionmaking,
including initiative decisionmaking)"2 should be structured to
guard against the possibility that "factions" of citizens might
take control of government and abuse its powers. According to
Madison, factions are composed of "a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 3
note 4, at 1153 (asserting the general point); Higginson, supra note 4, at 166 n.98
(referring to Madison's beliefs).
9. Frederick, supra note 4, at 117 (noting that "[d]espite the importance of
petitions in the colonies, the inclusion of a right of petition in the Constitution was
no certainty").
10. For general discussions of the proposed right of instruction, see THOMAS
E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 24-26 (1989); 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY 1091-1103 (1971); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDER-
ALIST 42-43, 223-24 (1981).
11. Madison drafted the original version of the First Amendment right of
petition. For futher background, see Smith, supra note 4, at 1175; Higginson,
supra note 4, at 155.
12. See infra p. 309.
13. WILLS, supra note 10, at 193-94.
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Madison feared any group of citizens-minority or majori-
ty-driven by self-interest to the exclusion of the interests of
other citizens or the interests of the public good and the
community as a whole. In the system of government advocated
by Madison, representatives were obligated by their office to
exercise judgment on behalf of the common good, after delibera-
tion and debate. Representatives could not fulfill these
obligations if a faction-even a majority faction-of voters had
a petition right of instruction that would bind representatives
to a particular position.'4
These arguments were grounded in part in a principle of
government trusteeship. 5  According to the trusteeship
principle, government has a trust relationship with all of its
citizens. As trustee of the res publica, government is obligated
to act for the general public good rather than in a partial or
self-serving manner. An instruction right would make it
impossible for representatives to take into account the public
good before adopting public policy; it would enable factions to
bind representatives to positions that served only the interests
of some voters, contrary to the trusteeship principle.
The trusteeship principle has firm roots in political
philosophy.'" It was an essential part of John Locke's writings
on government. 7 It was incorporated into many post-Revolu-
tion charters of state government. 8  Most importantly, the
principle of government trusteeship was familiar to and
accepted by a broad range of people instrumental to the framing
of the Constitution. Even those who were more skeptical of
elected representative government than Madison-for example,
Thomas Jefferson-believed in the principle."9  One cannot
doubt that this principle influenced the decision to favor the
14. CRONIN, supra note 10, at 28-29.
15. Id. at 27.
16. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Edmund Burke are both
associated with the idea, see CRONIN, supra note 10, at 27, 39, as are the classical
philosophers influencing advocates of contemporary civic republicanism. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1560-61
(1988); cf. Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 323 (1992) (discussing the concept of betrayals of trust responsibilities that
occur when public officials act under color of authority).
17. PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTION-
ALISM IN AMERICA 73-74 (1990).
18. Id. at 78-79.
19. See Calhoun, Voice in Government, supra note 2, at 432-34.
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First Amendment version of the petition right over a petition
right of instruction.
During the early years of our country's existence, the
nature of the right to petition Congress was vigorously and
publicly debated, particularly when abolitionists began heavily
using the petition in the early 1800s.2 0 In the last one hun-
dred and fifty years, however, there has not been much public
debate in the United States about the First Amendment right
of petition. There are only a few Supreme Court decisions that
discuss the kind of petitioning the Framers thought worthy of
constitutional protection.2' What does exist in Supreme Court
opinions, however, confirms ideas that recur in the historical
record of public debate.22
The Supreme Court Petitions Clause cases 23 tell us that
the constitutional petition right was adopted to ensure that
citizens could make their wishes known to government and that
government, in turn, could be responsive to the will of the
people. In Petitions Clause parlance, the will of the people is
not a phrase that describes how a majority of people feel at any
given moment about any given issue. Rather, the will of the
people is an aspirational concept, posited as something that
government strives to discern in the multitude of
views-majority, minority, or special interest-presented to it.
20. For a discussion of abolitionist petitioning, see Calhoun, Voice in
Government, supra note 2, at 436-39; Frederick, supra note 4, at 120. The
debaters argued about issues such as whether Congress had an obligation to reply
to petitions or even to receive them.
21. Only the following Supreme Court opinions include what I would
describe as discussions of the right of petition, and most of these discussions tend
to be rather brief: Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); McDonald v. Smith, 472
U.S. 479 (1985); Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S.
271 (1984); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); Smith
v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979); California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
22. In addition to the ideas that informed constitutional debate on
petitioning and the right of instruction, see supra notes 9-20 and accompanying
text, the ideas put forth during the early nineteenth-century debates on
abolitionist petitions are especially interesting. Regarding the latter debates, see
sources cited supra, note 20.
23. An extended analysis of the Petitions Clause cases can be found in
Calhoun, Voice in Government, supra note 2, at 440-52.
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The Supreme Court's Petitions Clause cases tell us that a
will of the people cannot be formed if some speakers are
excluded from government processes or public debate. A will of
the people cannot be formed even if those who are excluded are
in an extreme minority that can never hope to win a political
contest and can never hope to persuade a majority of citizens to
accept its views.
Because the Petitions Clause will of the people should
transcend mere majority preference, this will cannot be formed
when minority views are excluded. It is because the Petitions
Clause will of the people reflects the trusteeship principle that
government is accountable to all the people-not merely to a
majority or minority faction.24
This view of the will of the people is reinforced by the
imagery and metaphors used by the Supreme Court in discuss-
ing the constitutional right of petition. The Petitions Clause
cases are strikingly devoid of the adversarial, competitive
marketplace metaphors used in other First Amendment cases.
Instead, the Petitions Clause cases talk about how petitioning
works to promote collective action, assembly, communication for
common achievement, consultation with others respecting
public affairs, and the ability of all people to enter into transac-
tions and pacts with other people.
The right to petition the government is more than an
adversarial right of access to or control of government. Rather,
according to the Supreme Court, First Amendment rights,
presumably including the petition right, comprise a "charter for
government."25 The petition right ensures that government
will act as it is supposed to act, with the integrity and attitude
of a trustee for the people. It protects against government
processes that are corrupted because captured by minority or
majority factions.
24. Compare the Supreme Court's treatment of representative obligations
in contemporary voting rights analysis. Because in our constitutional system an
elected representative is charged with taking into account the interests of all of
the people, not merely the interests of the majority that elected her, political
structures that send a message that elected officials need represent only the
interests of some voters are constitutionally disfavored. See, e.g., Emily Calhoun,
Shaw v. Reno: On the Borderline, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 137 (1993) (discussing
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993), and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986)).
25. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
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The First Amendment petition right is a necessary incident
of citizenship in a government that can compel all citizens to
act to support its decisions-not merely those who voted for its
decision. It flows inexorably from the principle that govern-
ment is created as a trusteeship for more than mere fluid
majorities. It helps ensure that a will of the people will be
reflected in the adoption of policies that can be justified-and
are accountable-to all of the people.
Colorado's initiative petition process is designed to serve
values fundamentally different from the values and principles
served by the First Amendment petition right.26 At the risk
of repeating what may be obvious, I will elaborate on a few
differences that I find especially significant in thinking about
proposals for reform of the initiative process.
First, the Colorado initiative process is not designed to
facilitate cooperative transactions or pacts among citizens.
Rather, it is quintessentially adversarial from its beginning to
its end. It is not structured to promote the formation of a will
of the people that transcends factional interests.
Unless initiative proponents voluntarily choose to consult
with others early on, the initiative petition will embody
proposals for public policy driven by a single point of view.
Colorado law does not require deliberative debate in the
formation or refinement of proposals prior to their presentation
to voters. There is always, of course, debate about whether
voters should adopt a given proposal,, but the public de-
bate-conducted primarily through broadcast media-has the
quality of salesmanship. It is not the kind of deliberative
debate that classical political philosophers believed was
essential to a discussion of public policy and "the fate of
peoples."27
I am addressing an issue of structure. Madison's design for
representative government and the First Amendment petition
right took into account the tendency of people to organize
themselves into factions and interposed structures that would
26. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3, at 55-63; David B. Magleby, Let the
Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 13, 15-21 (1995).
27. See EDWARD P. CORBETT, CLASsIcAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN
STUDENT 516 (3d ed. 1990) ("Of the three types of oratory defined by the ancients
. the political was esteemed most highly, because it dealt with the loftiest of
issues; namely, the fate of peoples, rather than of individuals.").
Vol. 66]
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operate as a check on that tendency even when-perhaps
especially when-the faction consisted of majorities. The First
Amendment petition right was intended to help ensure that
government would not neglect its trust relationship to all of the
people.
The Colorado initiative process, however, was not designed
with this end in mind. To be sure, an initiative process can
protect groups of voters from being entirely ignored by a
legislature. When used with discretion, it can be a powerful
check on a legislature determined to ignore its trust responsibil-
ities to all of the people. But there is a significant difference
between initiative petitioning and First Amendment petitioning.
Even if a First Amendment petition itself embodies the
views of powerful factions (which it well may),28 First Amend-
ment petitioning leaves the final decision on public policy to
elected officials formally and informally constrained to act with
due regard to the trusteeship principle. In contrast, an
initiative petition (which is frequently captured by powerful,
special interest factions) gives a final decision on public policy
to voters who have no reason to take anything but private,
factional interests into account. The initiative process is not
internally structured to guard against the possibility that public
policy will be captured by factions and voters oriented only by
their own self-interest.
Unlike representatives, initiative voters who make final
decisions about public policy are neither formally nor informally
constrained by the responsibilities of a trustee. Initiative voters
28. It is important to recognize that the initiative petition itself is no more
and no less subject to exploitation by powerful interests than the petition for
redress of grievances. For example, the petition for redress of grievance came to
be used in England as "a favorite weapon in contests among the few for control of
the government. . . . [They] came from the top down, from parties within the
government contending against each other and seeking public support in the
contest." MORGAN, supra note 4, at 227. According to Morgan, "[P]etitions ...
[could be used as] one of the rituals of popular government, messages in which it
... [would be] difficult to distinguish the giver from the receiver, the supplicant
from the sovereign." Id. at 230. In the United States, petitions were used less
frequently by representatives themselves to gain leverage with colleagues, but
nonetheless the powerful often used them. The Virginia Statute of Religious
Liberty, drafted by Jefferson, was adopted only after Madison solicited petitions
from citizens for its approval (in response to a bill calling for a general state tax
to support religion). Id. at 229. Petitions to Congress became a weapon exploited
by powerful political interests and speakers in the debates over slavery preceding
the Civil War. See sources cited supra note 20.
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are not constrained by oath of office to think of all the people or
about whether measures will be sufficiently impartial that the
people in general will consent to their implementation. They
are not practically constrained by a need to explain or justify
their vote to their constituents. They can adopt policies without
worrying whether other members of government will be able to
implement those policies consistent with their oaths of office
and trust responsibilities. As Jane Mansbridge has commented
in a slightly different context, it would be remarkable were
preferences formulated under these conditions to tend toward
anything other than the private.29
As a practical matter (and contrary to the myth favored by
its extreme advocates), the initiative process is a form of
representative decisionmaking about public policy. Through the
initiative, only some of all registered voters decide on policies
affecting themselves and other voters of the jurisdiction. But
the policies also affect significant numbers of non-voters who
live, work, or own property within the jurisdiction. These non-
voters might include, among others, people under the age of 18,
citizens like the mentally disabled who cannot qualify to vote,
people qualified to vote who for some reason do not vote
(perhaps many elderly or low income citizens), people who live
in the community for a significant portion of the year but who
choose to vote elsewhere, people whose work brings them to the
community and on whom the community depends for its well-
being, or people who own commercial property in the communi-
ty but vote elsewhere.
All of these persons are part of the community: they
contribute to it and their well-being depends on the policies
adopted for it. In a real-world sense, they are involved in the
res publica. In the initiative process, however, their interests
29. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADvERSARY DEMOCRACY 301 (1983). As
conducted today, voting is essentially a very private activity. Mansbridge
describes the essentially private nature of voting the following way (and if we are
honest, most of us will recognize our own behavior in this description):
Citizens file into a curtained box, mark a preference, and file out. In
special circumstances, if a big-city political machine is at work or if the
community is small, they may see someone they know on the way in and
out of the box, smile, and exchange a triviality. Most voters see no one
they know. They sit in their homes; they consume information; they
determine a preference; they go to the polling place; they register their
preference; they return to their homes.
Vol. 661
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will be represented-if at all-only by the small percentage of
eligible voters who actually vote.3°
The trusteeship principle and governing structures that
promote it are-as the Constitution's Framers understood-a
necessary prerequisite to the legitimacy of representative
government. The initiative form of representative decision-
making, however, ignores these principled and structural
prerequisites of legitimacy. Initiative structures place final
decisions respecting public policy in the hands of some (repre-
sentative) voters who are not constrained to take any account
of the trust obligations that a representative owes to the
collective people. Indeed, the initiative process actually
enhances the likelihood that final decisions on public policy will
ignore trustee responsibilities.
Were initiatives the only-or even the primary-way of
governing in Colorado, we would have a system of representa-
tive government devoid of essential, legitimizing structures and
operating principles. Proposals for reforming the initiative
process need to be evaluated with this fact in mind.
To date, Colorado's initiative process has not been the
dominant process for making final decisions about public policy.
The initiative process has generally functioned in tandem with
conventional structures of representative government without
abrogating the trusteeship principle of the First Amendment.
But what would proposed reforms do both to the existing
balance between conventional and initiative forms of represen-
tative decisionmaking and to the trusteeship principle? To
restate Professor Magleby's concern about the effects of the
initiative on representative government: Would these reforms
enhance or diminish the possibilities for government to act as
a trustee?3 '
Some reforms would simply make the initiative process a
better or a fairer adversarial process, without compromising
other governmental structures. Reforms that promote voter
understanding of the substance of an initiative and of the
people, organizations, and money that support it, and that limit
the ability of special interests to hide self-serving measures
deep in the verbiage of lengthy proposals make the adversarial
process fairer. These sorts of reforms seem perfectly appropri-
30. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3, at 52; Magleby, supra note 26, at 32-34.
31. Magleby, supra note 26, at 45.
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ate and there should be no objection to them. If citizens find
that the legislature is ignoring its trusteeship responsibilities,
or that their voices and issues of importance to them are
systematically excluded from the legislative agenda, they may
well need an adversary process like the initiative. And if some
citizens need an adversary process in such circumstances, we
should give them-and all citizens-the fairest adversary
process possible.
Other reforms would basically transform the initiative
process. That would be the result, for example, of changing the
Colorado initiative process to conform to the Swiss model that
Professors Collins and Oesterle describe.32 Reforms of this
sort would suit someone who objects to the initiative petition
process per se, which I do not. I see no reason to eliminate the
initiative entirely or to change its essentially adversarial
character. Used sparingly, in tandem with conventional
processes and as a check against the possibility that elected
officials might themselves ignore trustee responsibilities to all
of the people, the initiative process can promote realization of
the trusteeship principle.
Among proposed reforms to the initiative process, however,
are those that threaten to disrupt the balance between the
initiative and other representative processes of government. At
their worst, these reforms would enable factions to dominate
the formation of public policy, eclipsing other processes
essential to having a government that can act as a trustee for
all the people. The most worrisome of this sort of reform was
embodied in proposed Amendment 12."
32. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3, at 80.
33. Another, less troublesome, proposal is the suggestion that the legislature
should become involved in "drafting" initiative petitions proposed by others.
Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3, at 79. Legislative involvement in "drafting" is
no substitute for the type of legislative involvement that would serve First Amend-
ment petition values and the trusteeship principle. Drafting will likely not reflect
a broad range of views, will probably not be done publicly, and legislators will not
be asked to take a public position to which they will be held accountable by their
constituents. The very term--"drafting"-accurately describes in what legislators
will be involved: a bureaucratic task.
Unfortunately, although legislative involvement in drafting does not actually
serve the trusteeship principle or First Amendment petition values, it may very
well be taken to serve them. Voters may be encouraged to believe that a proposal
emanating from legislative halls has some kind of legislative imprimatur when,
in fact, it has none. Voters may mistakenly believe that initiative measures have
been endorsed or reviewed with the interests of all the people in mind. Whatever
Vol. 66]
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My purpose, here, is not to describe the provisions of
Amendment 12. Others have done so. I simply recommend an
evaluation of Amendment 12's proposals in light of the following
assertions.
Under Amendment 12, conventional processes of public
policy decisionmaking-processes structured to help ensure that
public policy will reflect more than factional interests-would
have been subordinated to the initiative, a process most
frequently used without regard to the trusteeship principle.
The provisions of Amendment 12 would have made it almost
impossible for representative bodies to formulate or implement
public policy that serves all of the people and fulfills the trust
obligation of government. They would have made it easier for
factions to capture public policy. They would have deprived
citizens of an ability to hold accountable the promoters of
policies that serve only majority or minority factions. Even
judicial checks on special interest factions would have been
compromised by new recall provisions.
The bulk of Amendment 12's "reforms" would not have
served values that had constitutional significance for the
Framers of our Constitution. As Jane Mansbridge said, "To
maintain its legitimacy, a democracy must have both a unitary
and an adversary face."34 Proposed Amendment 12 contained
provisions that would have removed our government's legitimat-
ing, unitary face, a face represented by conventional governing
structures that offer at least some realistic hope that public
policy will be based on the trusteeship principle. If these
conventional structures are not working well, the solution is not
to adopt so-called reforms like those of Amendment 12 which
will only exacerbate the situation; the solution is to become
serious about reforming conventional structures of representa-
tive government.
As for reforming the initiative process itself, let me add to
my colleagues' suggestions one additional, simple reform
proposal. I propose that each initiative measure on the election
ballot should be preceded by the following reminder.35
clarity might arguably be gained through legislative drafting, that gain does not
compensate for the danger in the proposal.
34. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 300.
35. The proposed reminder is intended to alert citizens who act as direct
lawmakers to their trust responsibilities. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM




WHEN YOU CAST YOUR VOTE YOU WILL ACT AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF OTHER CITIZENS AFFECTED
BY THIS ISSUE OF PUBLIC POLICY. PLEASE TAKE
SERIOUSLY YOUR REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF ALL OF THE PEO-
PLE WHEN YOU VOTE. YOUR VOTE SHOULD NOT
BE CAST IN FAVOR OF THIS PROPOSAL UNTIL
YOU HAVE FIRST CONSIDERED WHETHER IT
WORKS FOR THE COMMON GOOD OR ONLY PAR-
TIALLY, FOR SOME FACTION OF THE PEOPLE.
This initiative measure was formulated without
formal representative deliberation by whose
financial support comes primarily from
You should vote against this measure EITHER if you
believe it does not serve the common good OR if you
believe that alternatives to this proposal-alternatives
that might better work for the people as a whole-have
not been fully considered.
If you vote no because you believe alternatives have
not been sufficiently considered and you wish to have
the proposal referred to the legislature for such consider-
ation, please check the box below.
A reminder of this sort will not guarantee that people who
participate in an initiative election will act appropriately as
representative voters. It will, however, offer at least some hope
that the initiative process will work better, both to provide
citizen access when government ignores its trust responsibilities
and in tandem with conventional processes that-unlike the
initiative-are inherently structured to fulfill trust responsibili-
ties.
to be something other than a purely private activity which can be engaged in
without regard to the interests of the public good).
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